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I. INTRODUCTION 
Earlier in my career, I viewed myself primarily as an employment law 
scholar. Over time, I have come to think of myself less as an employment law 
person and more of a Torts and Professional Responsibility person. There are 
lots of reasons for that, but one is that I simply became frustrated with 
discrimination law. In some ways, it seemed that the courts had unnecessarily 
complicated certain issues at the expense of a focus on the real issue in any 
case: whether the employer engaged in illegal discrimination. I decided I much 
preferred the order and substantive focus in tort law to the unnecessary 
complexity and relentless focus on procedure that permeates discrimination law. 
One area of employment discrimination law that I remain interested in, 
however, is workplace retaliation, perhaps because, at its core, it seems “tortier” 
in nature than the discrimination side of discrimination law.  
As Professor William Corbett discusses in his article, What Is Troubling 
About the “Tortification” of Employment Discrimination Law?, the Supreme 
Court in recent years has increasingly tortified employment discrimination law.1 
With its decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. 
Nassar2 in 2013, the Court has now used tort principles to help shape the 
development of my beloved retaliation law under Title VII and other 
                                                                                                                   
 * Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. 
 1 See William R. Corbett, What Is Troubling About the “Tortification” of Employment 
Discrimination Law?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1027, 1028 (2014). 
 2 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
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discrimination statutes. In theory, as a Torts guy, all of this should make me 
happy. But Professor Corbett’s article effectively illustrates why it doesn’t. 
Corbett doesn’t talk a lot about Nassar, viewing the decision mostly as an 
extension of prior precedent.3 But I think that Nassar actually illustrates many 
of Corbett’s concerns about the Court’s use of tort law, most notably the fact 
that the Court does not seem very good at it and that this has potential negative 
implications for future issues. What’s more, I think the decision is the clearest 
indication yet that a majority of the Court is intent on importing tort principles 
into employment discrimination law whenever possible, regardless of the 
appropriateness of that action. That’s why Corbett’s suggested approach 
concerning how courts should go about the task of relying upon tort law to flesh 
out the contours of employment discrimination is potentially so useful. 
II. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER V. NASSAR: A 
RETROGRADE APPROACH TO TORT LAW 
I admire Professor Corbett’s attempts to serve as an “archaeologist[] of 
causation standards,”4 and I think he does an admirable job of tracking the 
evolution of the Court’s reliance on tort law.5 In fact, my only quibble with his 
article is that I think he underestimates the importance of the Court’s 2013 
decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar. 
Perhaps more than any of the Court’s prior decisions, Nassar reveals just how 
intent the Court is on incorporating its view of tort law into statutory 
discrimination law.  
Nassar involved a seemingly straightforward issue of statutory 
construction: the meaning of the word “because” in Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision. Title VII most famously prohibits an employer from discriminating 
against an individual “because” of the individual’s race or other characteristic as 
identified in the statute.6 Elsewhere, the statute explains that this section is 
violated when the employee’s race or other characteristic was “a motivating 
factor” for the employer’s action.7 Race is a “motivating factor” where “the 
motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer 
also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer’s decision.”8 
Thus, an employee is not required to show that the adverse employment action 
would not have occurred “but for” his race or other protected characteristic.9  
                                                                                                                   
 3 See Corbett, supra note 1, at 1030. 
 4 Id. at 1052. 
 5 I also think he’s right when he identifies Justice O’Connor as being the most 
thoughtful of the justices when it comes to her application of tort law to employment 
discrimination statutes. See id. at 1062. 
 6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 8 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013). 
 9 Id. at 2522–23. 
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Another section of Title VII, Section 704(a), prohibits an employer from 
retaliating against an employee “because” the employee has opposed unlawful 
discrimination or participated in a proceeding under Title VII.10 However, 
unlike Title VII’s anti-discrimination section, Section 704(a) does not include 
the “motivating factor” language. Thus, the question in Nassar was what 
causation standard applies in a Section 704(a) retaliation case.11   
The question was made more complex by virtue of the tortured legislative 
and judicial history surrounding Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes. 
While Title VII requires only that a discrimination plaintiff establish that race 
was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision,12 the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA)13 does not include the “motivating factor” language. 
In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, the Court concluded that the stricter but-for 
causation standard applies in age discrimination actions.14 The majority opinion 
in Gross makes only one reference to tort law and its use of the but-for 
standard.15 Instead, the decision is based largely on dictionary definitions and 
prior decisions.16 
Based on its decision in Gross, it might have been possible for the Court to 
resolve Nassar purely on the grounds of precedent and text. And, to some 
extent, the majority opinion does rely on these grounds.17 But it is tort law that 
gets the train rolling in Nassar. Rather than begin his argument with a resort to 
precedent and text, Justice Kennedy chose to begin with an examination of how 
tort law supported his conclusion that Section 704(a) employs a but-for 
causation standard.18 In the second sentence, Kennedy explains, “The requisite 
relation between prohibited conduct and compensable injury is governed by the 
principles of causation, a subject most often arising in elaborating the law of 
torts.”19 Kennedy made clear early in the opinion that he viewed the statutory 
interpretation issue through the lens of common law. Referencing existing 
principles of construction, Kennedy observed that “Congress is understood to 
legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles. Thus, 
where a common-law principle is well established . . . the courts may take it as 
given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will 
                                                                                                                   
 10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 11 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523. 
 12 Actually, that’s not entirely right. As Professor Corbett notes, there are actually two 
different causation standards and two proof structures, “pretext and mixed motives––and we 
have no guidelines as to which applies to any given case.” Corbett, supra note 1, at 1053. 
But, for the sake of this Response, I’ll keep it simple. 
 13 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012). 
 14 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009). 
 15 Id. at 176–77. 
 16 Id. at 177. 
 17 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525–28 (2013). 
 18 Id. at 2524–25. 
 19 Id. at 2522. 
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apply except ‘when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.’”20 It was 
only after establishing what Kennedy believed to be the background of 
common-law principles that he felt the need to focus more explicitly on text and 
precedent. 
The problem—in the words of Professor Corbett—is that the majority 
adopts a “retrograde view” of the relevant tort law.21 The issue in Nassar was 
whether Section 704(a) employs the simple but-for causation standard applied 
in straightforward tort cases, or whether it employs a standard more like that 
commonly applied in more complex cases involving what the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts refers to as “multiple sufficient causes.”22 According to Section 
27 of the Restatement, “If multiple acts occur, each of which . . . alone would 
have been a factual cause of the physical harm at the same time in the absence 
of the other act(s), each act is regarded as a factual cause of the harm.”23 This 
standard is essentially a reformulation and clarification of the “substantial 
factor” test that is used when there are multiple causes contributing to a result.24 
The leading case on the substantial factor approach is Anderson v. 
Minneapolis St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co.25 There, the defendant’s 
negligence resulted in a fire, which joined with another fire of unknown 
origin.26 The resulting fire then destroyed the plaintiff’s property.27 Application 
of the traditional but-for causation test might have allowed the defendant to 
avoid liability: but for the defendant’s negligence, the harm still would have 
occurred due to the presence of the other fire. But the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota was unwilling to permit a wrongdoer to avoid liability based on the 
fortuitous circumstance that there were multiple sufficient causes of the 
plaintiff’s injury. Instead, the court held that in such cases, the plaintiff could 
recover when the defendant’s negligence was a substantial or material factor in 
bringing about the harm.28  
Anderson is just one example of a situation in which courts have been 
willing to depart from the but-for standard in the face of difficult causation 
issues. Perhaps the most famous other example is Summers v. Tice,29 the case 
all Torts students remember as involving the two hunters who both were 
negligent in firing their guns. The problem for the plaintiff was that while both 
                                                                                                                   
 20 Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). 
 21 Corbett, supra note 1, at 1031. 
 22 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 
(2010). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. § 27 cmt. b. 
 25 Anderson v. Minneapolis St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 
1920). 
 26 Id. at 46. 
 27 Id.  
 28 Id. at 48. 
 29 Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1948). 
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hunters were negligent, only one of them caused his injuries and he was unable 
to prove who the responsible party was.30 Again, strict application of traditional 
causation rules would have meant that the plaintiff’s injuries would have gone 
uncompensated. Instead, the Supreme Court of California modified the 
causation element of a negligence claim in such cases to prevent injustice. In 
such cases, the burden shifts to each defendant to establish that he was not the 
actual cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.31 
Based on Justice Kennedy’s stated desire to give effect to Congress’s 
expectation that well-established common-law principles would be incorporated 
within a statute, one logical question that emerges is whether the substantial 
factor/multiple-sufficient-cause approach was well-established and constituted 
the background against which Congress was legislating when it enacted Title 
VII. A quick glance at virtually any Torts casebook might help to answer that 
question. While all get across the idea that the but-for standard is the norm, each 
devotes significant attention to some of the more complex causation-in-fact 
issues courts sometimes confront. For example, nearly all contain material on 
the Summers v. Tice problem. Relatedly, most include at least some mention of 
pharmaceutical cases, in which a plaintiff may face the almost insurmountable 
problem of trying to identify which manufacturer out of many produced the 
drug that actually caused her injuries.32 Many of the casebooks contain material 
devoted to the “loss of chance” problem in medical malpractice cases, in which 
a doctor’s negligence was statistically unlikely to have caused the ultimate harm 
suffered by a patient, but, nonetheless, may have deprived the patient of a 
chance of a better outcome.33 Some include material designed to illustrate more 
general proof problems that plaintiffs face when confronted with a situation in 
which there are multiple possible explanations for the plaintiff’s injuries, only 
one of which was the fault of the defendant.34  
Importantly, virtually every casebook contains a section devoted to the 
multiple-sufficient-cause problem identified in the Restatement. Nearly all 
include—either as a primary case or in the notes—the venerable Anderson case 
involving the two fires set by separate parties, in which the court applied a 
                                                                                                                   
 30 Id. at 2. 
 31 Id. at 4. 
 32 See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y. 1989). 
 33 See, e.g., Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 823 (Mass. 2008); Joseph H. 
King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting 
Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1353–55 (1981).  
 34 For example, the book I use includes Stubbs v. City of Rochester, 124 N.E. 137 (N.Y. 
1919), an old case from New York in which the plaintiff contracted typhoid fever. One 
possible explanation for the plaintiff’s injury was that he drank water, supplied by the 
defendant, that was contaminated by sewage. Id. at 138. There were also a host of other 
possible explanations for the contraction of typhoid fever, none of which were the fault of 
the defendant. Id.; see also MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 334 
(9th ed. 2011). 
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substantial factor test.35 The casebooks may differ in terms of how much 
attention they devote to this issue, but the but-for causation standard is 
invariably covered in less detail than the substantial factor/multiple-sufficient-
cause standard. 
Yet, as portrayed by the majority decision in Nassar, there is really only 
one meaningful causation standard in tort law: the but-for standard. Justice 
Kennedy notes that “[i]n the usual course,” the causation-in-fact standard in tort 
law requires a plaintiff to establish that the harm would not have occurred but 
for the defendant’s conduct.36 He then cites numerous sections from the various 
Restatements of Torts to this effect. Justice Kennedy’s string cite does include 
one reference to the exception for cases involving multiple sufficient causes, but 
Kennedy includes a quote from the Restatement (Third) of Torts in a 
parenthetical to the effect that “cases invoking the concept are rare.”37 (Nothing 
to see here, Justice Kennedy assures us.) He then includes a sentence 
summarizing for the reader the idea that the but-for standard is “textbook tort 
law.”38 He then wraps up with a third and final sentence concluding that “[t]his, 
then, is the background against which Congress legislated in enacting Title VII, 
and these are the default rules it is presumed to have incorporated, absent an 
indication to the contrary in the statute itself.”39 And so in the space of one 
paragraph, consisting of three sentences, Justice Kennedy dispenses with 
virtually everything that makes the issue of causation-in-fact such a rich and 
intellectually challenging area of the law and reduces causation-in-fact to but-
for causation.40 The fact that but-for causation is merely the default rule from 
which courts depart in the face of more complicated causation issues is of little 
consequence. 
To Justice Kennedy, there are several indications that a common-law rule 
served as part of “the background against which Congress legislated.”41 One is 
inclusion of the rule within the Restatement.42 Indeed, Justice Kennedy cites to 
                                                                                                                   
 35 E.g., DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION 215 (7th ed. 2013); VICTOR 
E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 292 
(12th ed. 2010). 
 36 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013). 
 37 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 27 cmt. b (2010)). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 In a subsequent criminal law case in 2014, Justice Scalia again downplayed any 
alternate approaches to causation and repeated the notion that but-for causation “is one of the 
traditional background principles ‘against which Congress legislate[s].’” Burrage v. U.S., 
134 S. Ct. 881, 889 (2014) (quoting Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525). Scalia continued to insist 
that decisions departing from the but-for test “when multiple sufficient causes 
independently, but concurrently, produce a result” are “rare.” Id. at 890. 
 41 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525. 
 42 The “imprimatur” of the Restatement carries great weight with courts and often 
“substitutes for independent thought.” Matthew W. Finkin, Shoring Up the Citadel (At-Will 
Employment), 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 28 (2006). 
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the Restatements eight times in one string cite.43 Yet, Justice Kennedy manages 
to largely ignore the fact that the Restatements have also always included the 
substantial factor test. Anderson, the leading case on the substantial factor test, 
was decided in 1920. The substantial factor test itself was enshrined in the first 
Restatement of Torts in 1934,44 thirty years before Title VII’s enactment.  
A second relevant consideration to Justice Kennedy is how often a rule has 
actually been applied by the courts. Here, Kennedy has an ace up his sleeve. 
Yes, Section 27 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts lists an exception to the 
general but-for causation standard, Kennedy’s string cite tells us, but the authors 
of the Restatement themselves note that cases invoking that exception are rare.45 
Therefore, according to Justice Kennedy, the default rule Congress meant to 
incorporate in Title VII is but-for causation. Yet, the authors of the Restatement 
present a somewhat more complicated view of the extent to which the 
substantial factor/multiple-sufficient-cause rule has actually been applied in 
practice. A comment notes that “courts have long imposed liability when a 
tortfeasor’s conduct, while not necessary for the outcome, would have been a 
factual cause if the other competing cause had not been operating.”46 Indeed, 
there were numerous cases decided well prior to the passage of Title VII in 
which courts applied the substantial factor outlined in the Restatement.47  A 
Reporters’ Note accompanying Section 27 notes that “[t]here is near-universal 
recognition of the inappropriateness of the but-for standard for factual causation 
when multiple sufficient causes exist” and then cites numerous cases to this 
effect.48 Thus, the comments accompanying Section 27 suggest that the 
substantial factor rule is hardly the anomaly in Tort law that Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion indicates and that decisions invoking the concept are less rare than they 
might seem. 
                                                                                                                   
 43 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525. 
 44 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 432(2) (1934). 
 45 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 
cmt. b (2010). The Reporters’ Note offers one possible explanation as to the supposed dearth 
of decisions involving this concept: “One reason for the paucity of multiple-sufficient-cause 
cases may be that this phenomenon's presence frequently is not recognized.” Id. § 27 cmt. b, 
Reporters’ Note.  
 46 Id. § 27 cmt. a (emphasis added). 
 47 For example, in Rey v. Colonial Nav. Co., 116 F.2d 580, 581 (2d Cir. 1941), the 
plaintiff contracted tuberculosis. His resistance to tuberculosis had been lowered, either as a 
result of having syphilis (which was not the fault of the defendant) or as a result of damp 
sleeping quarters (which was the fault of the defendant). Id. at 582–83. The Second Circuit 
cited Section 432 in support of the idea that where there were concurring causes of an injury 
and there was sufficient evident that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in 
bringing about the injury, liability was proper. Id. at 583. Maxfield v. Maxfield, 151 A.2d 
226, 228 (N.H. 1959), involved a plaintiff who slipped and fell on some butternuts on a path 
while rushing to save her car, which was engulfed in flames. The defendant was not at fault 
for the presence of the butternuts, but was at fault for the fire. Id. at 229–30. Citing Section 
432, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that liability could attach. Id. at 230.  
 48 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 
cmt. a, Reporter’s Note (2010). 
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Finally, any question as to whether the rule outlined in Section 27 formed 
part of the background against which Congress legislated might be resolved by 
considering the extent to which the rule had effectively become “textbook tort 
law.” Here, Justice Kennedy quotes Prosser & Keeton—the most famous 
hornbook on the subject of tort law—in support of his conclusion that the but-
for causation test is the only causation test of any moment.49 However, 
Kennedy’s opinion omits Prosser & Keeton’s fairly lengthy discussion of the 
substantial factor rule, a rule which the authors note “has found general 
acceptance.”50 Kennedy also fails to cite the other leading hornbook on tort law, 
which states matter-of-factly that “[w]hen each of two or more causes is 
sufficient standing alone to cause the plaintiff's harm, courts usually drop the 
but-for test.”51 Finally, there is the fact, previously mentioned, that pretty much 
every modern Torts casebook devotes significant attention to the multiple-
sufficient-cause problem.52 Of course, these modern casebooks were not part of 
the background against which Congress acted in passing Title VII. Fortunately, 
my school’s library has a bunch of the books that were in print around that time, 
and, as it turns out, they tend to deal with the causation question in a similar 
manner. The casebooks devote significant time to more complex causation 
issues. So, for example, Summers v. Tice appears,53 as does Anderson and its 
substantial factor test in the case of multiple sufficient causes.54  
When considered alongside other recent decisions in which the Court has 
tortified employment discrimination law, Nassar suggests that a majority of the 
Court is intent on incorporating tort law into statutory employment 
discrimination law. What’s more, Nassar suggests that a majority of the Court 
isn’t really interested in expending the energy necessary to do it well. As 
Professor Corbett notes, both tort law and discrimination law share a core 
principle of seeking to deter undesirable conduct.55 Retaliation provisions, in 
particular, exist in large measure as a means of furthering the deterrent goals of 
discrimination law. As such, Nassar seems like the kind of situation in which 
tort law and common-law decision-making might actually be useful. In the case 
of multiple causes in tort actions, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has noted 
that wrongful conduct “will be more effectively deterred by imposing liability 
than by giving the wrongdoer a windfall in cases where an all-sufficient 
                                                                                                                   
 49 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013) (quoting W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 50 KEETON, supra note 49, § 41 at 267. 
 51 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 189 (2d ed. 2011). 
 52 See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
 53 CHARLES O. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 11 
(1959). 
 54 FRANCIS H. BOHLEN & FOWLER V. HARPER, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 200 (4th 
ed. 1941); WILLIAM L. PROSSER & JOHN W. WADE, TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 277 (5th 
ed. 1952).  
 55 See Corbett, supra note 1, at 1045. 
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innocent cause happens to concur with his wrong in producing the harm.”56 Yet, 
there is no hint in Nassar about how the but-for standard furthers the deterrent 
goal of Title VII, nor is there any meaningful effort to analyze tort law in any 
serious manner. 
III. NASSAR AND THE CONTINUING TORTIFICATION OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 
If, as I believe, Nassar really does signal that a majority of the Court is not 
just inclined but in fact anxious to use tort law to fill in the gaps of statutory 
discrimination law, Professor Corbett’s article couldn’t come at a better time. 
Corbett’s assessment of the problems caused by the Court’s approach is spot on. 
The Court’s application of its “retrograde view” of tort law has “resulted largely 
in a complex and almost chaotic common law of employment discrimination, 
which ill serves the grand objectives of the statutes.”57 The big concerns are 
what the Court will do in the future and whether it will find a principled way of 
applying tort law. 
The Court’s current, superficial approach to incorporating tort law might 
potentially lead to other undesirable outcomes. Corbett identifies one tort theory 
that might find its way into employment discrimination law: assumption of 
risk.58 Agency principles are another possibility. The Court has already 
imported agency principles into its sexual harassment jurisprudence in 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth59 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.60 
The Court’s efforts in this regard were met with a fair amount of criticism, 
including the complaint that the Court had misread an obscure provision of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency in formulating a new standard for employer 
liability in sexual harassment cases.61 Indeed, Professor Paula Dalley has 
referred to the Court’s application of this agency rule—which was not even 
retained in the Restatement (Third) of Agency—as “bad applications of 
imperfectly understood legal rules.”62  There are other situations in which the 
Court might be tempted to borrow from agency law—or, better stated, its own 
version of agency law—in order to supplement existing statutory discrimination 
                                                                                                                   
 56 Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 429 (2d Cir. 1969) (quoting HARPER & 
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.2, at 1123 (1956)). This echoes a similar idea expressed by 
Judge Learned Hand years earlier: “the single tortfeasor cannot be allowed to escape through 
the meshes of a logical net. He is a wrongdoer; let him unravel the casuistries resulting from 
his wrong.” Navigazione Libera T.S.A. v. Newtown Creek Towing Co., 98 F.2d 694, 697 
(2d Cir. 1938). 
 57 Corbett, supra note 1, at 1031. 
 58 See id. at 1070–71. 
 59 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 60 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 61 Paula J. Dalley, All in a Day’s Work: Employers’ Vicarious Liability for Sexual 
Harassment, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 517, 519 (2002).  
 62 Id. 
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law. Perhaps the most notable situation in which agency principles might prove 
relevant is in the case of employer liability for coworker retaliation, an area 
where a circuit split exists and courts have already imported common-law 
agency principles with mixed results.63  
The Court’s treatment of tort law in Nassar is also likely to stunt the 
development of employment discrimination law in unfortunate ways. Corbett 
offers the possibility that the tort concept of proportional liability might (and he 
emphasizes might) be suitable for use in discrimination cases.64 But the Court’s 
rudimentary approach to tort law in Nassar might serve as a clue to lower courts 
and deter them from even considering the adoption of more nuanced legal 
principles like proportional liability. Moreover, the Court’s insistence in Nassar 
that the tort principle in question must have been part of “the background 
against which Congress legislated”65 might prevent any meaningful 
consideration of the loss-of-chance theory that Corbett identifies as a possible 
candidate for inclusion. Aside from the fact that loss of chance is a fairly exotic 
doctrine for a Court that views causation in fact solely in terms of but-for 
causation, loss of chance was certainly not “textbook hornbook law” at the time 
Title VII was enacted.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
All of which is somewhat depressing for someone who loves torts and still 
at least has feelings for employment discrimination law. The Court’s insistence 
in Nassar that the relevant common-law principle must have served as part of 
the background of the law when Congress enacted Title VII may prevent lower 
courts from considering potentially relevant theories. More generally, Nassar’s 
retrograde view of tort law has already negatively impacted the development of 
discrimination law and actually makes it more likely that such decaying all-or-
nothing tort theories as assumption of risk and contributory fault will somehow 
find their way into discrimination law. 
What should be done? Professor Corbett is exactly right that Congress 
needs to assume some responsibility and fix the unnecessarily complex 
statutory discrimination regime that currently exists. And, unfortunately, 
Corbett is also probably exactly right that this isn’t likely to happen to anytime 
soon. 
                                                                                                                   
 63 See Alex B. Long & Sandra F. Sperino, Diminishing Retaliation Liability, 88 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. ONLINE 7, 7–8 (2013). Several courts utilize a negligence standard, in which an 
employer is liable if the employer had actual or constructive knowledge about the coworker 
harassment but failed to take adequate remedial action. E.g., Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 
461 F.3d 331, 349 (3d Cir. 2006). In contrast, the Fifth Circuit, applying its view of agency 
principles, requires that a plaintiff satisfy the extremely difficult threshold that the coworker 
harassment was in furtherance of the employer’s business. See Hernandez v. Yellow 
Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 649, 657 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 64 See Corbett, supra note 1, at 1071–76. 
 65 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013). 
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This makes developing a more robust approach to analyzing the 
applicability of common-law principles to statutory discrimination law the next-
best option. As Professor Corbett demonstrates in his discussion of Justice 
O’Connor’s approach to the issue, there is certainly precedent for such an 
approach. Perhaps it is not too late for the courts to adopt the kind of rigorous 
analytical approach to the question of when common-law principles should be 
adopted that Corbett suggests. 
